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Erosion of "Subtle Hazards" Analysis Jeopardizes Safety and 
Soundness of the Banking System: Securities Industry Association 
v. Board of Governors (NATWEST) - The Glass-Steagall Act - the 
popular name for sections 16, 20, 21 and 32 of the Banking Act of 
1933 1 - traditionally has operated as a barrier between commercial 
and investment banking. ~ Congress enacted Glass-Steagall in re-
sponse to perceived widespread abuses by commercial banks in-
volved in ecurities activities .3 The public saw these activities, as did 
Congress, as a primary cause of the stock, market crash of 1929 and 
its accompanying bank failures. 4 By restricting commercial banks to 
the business of commercial banking, Congress sought to restore 
public confidence in the banking system.5 
The most significant policy rationale underlying Glass-Steagall 
is the safety and soundness of the banking system.6 Congress en-
'12 U.S.C. §§24 (Seventh), 78, 377, 378 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
2 Commercial banks are organizations which fall into one o f four categories. National 
banks are chartered , inspected and regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency. Such 
banks are required to be insured members of the Federal Reserve System (FRS). State 
member banks are regulated by the state in which they operate. As FRS members, they are 
regulated by the FRS, and are required to be insured. Insured, non-member banks have all 
the characteristics of state member banks, but are nol part of the FRS. Non-insured, non-
member banks are stale regulated. but do not belong to t.he FRS. For an overview of various 
bank classifications and their regulatory structure , see Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model 
oj Competition in Regulation. 30 STAN. L. REV. 1. 3-23 (1977) . 
Though commercial bank activities are continually evolving. the Supre me Court descrip-
tion of commercial banks as ins titutio ns "that receive deposits subject to repayment. lend 
money. discount and negotiate promissory notes and the like" remains a valid one. Investment 
Co. Ins!. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 , 629 (197 1); see also l2 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). Section 24 
empowers banks to "carryon the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating 
promissory notes, drafts . bills of excha nge, and other evidence of debt; by receiving de posits. 
by buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion ; by loaning money on personal security; 
and by obtaining. issuing, and circulating notes . . .. " .. 
In contrast. investment banking firms offer such services as brokerage. secunues under-
writing. advisory services. merger and acquisition assistance and mutual fund management. 
Note. Restrictions on Bank Underwriting of Corporate Securities: A Proposal for More Perrmsswe 
Regulation. 97 HARV. L REV. 720-2 1 n.9 (1984). 
' See Norton. Up Against " the Wall": Glass-Steagall and the Dilemma of a Deregulated (' Rere-
gulated") Banking Envimmnent, 42 Bus . LAW. 327,327 (1987). 
• See Ianni, "Security" Under the Glass-Steagall Act and the Federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 
1934: The Di!'ection of the Supreme Cow·t's Analy;is. 100 BANKING L.J. 100, 103-05 (.1983). 
5 Norton . supra nOte 3, at 327 . T he separation between commerCial and lI1vestment 
banking was not a new development in 1933, but rather was part of the finanCial structure 
the United States inherited from Great Britain. In some countries. such as. France and 
Germany, commercial and investment banking activities are largely combined . FIscher. Gram , 
Kaufman & Mote, The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: A Legal and EconomIc AnalySIS. 
51 TEI\N . L. REV. 467 . 469 (1984) [hereinafte r. Fischer]. . . ld' 95 
6 See Plotkin , What M eaning Does Glass-Steagall Have Fo!' Today's Ftnancwl Wor . , 
BANKING LJ. 404 , 407 (1 978). 
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acted Glass-Steagall because many legislators believed that commer-
cial bank ventures in the securities field created the potential for 
practices that could undermine the system. 7 T~e U ~ite~ Stat~s Su-
preme Court, upon examining Glass-Steagall s legislative history, 
found that Congress sought not only to prevent banks from invest-
ing their own assets imprudently in securities, but also to prevent 
the more "subtle hazards" that ari e when commercial banks enter 
the investment banking business. 8 
The Court also gleaned from Glass-Steagall's legislative history 
that Congress considered that the policy of furthering competition 
might favor commercial bank entry into investment banking.9 Con-
gress, however, stated the Court, determined that the potential for 
financial dangers outweighed other policy considerations. lo Com-
mercial banks are the focus of such heightened concern for safety 
and soundness because they playa fundamental role in the econ-
omy.11 Realizing that banks were "special," Congress imposed pro-
tectionary measures to ensure that the institutions remained capable 
of supplying their unique services. 12 Legislators and regulators im-
pose operational restrictions on banks in the belief that preventing 
Id. 
7 See Camp , 401 U.S. a t 629-30; see also Ianni, supra note 4, at 103-04. 
s Camp, 401 U.S. at 630. The Court stated: 
The hazards that Congress had in mind were not limited to the obvious danger 
that a bank might invest its own assets in frozen or otherwise imprudent stock 
or secunty mvestments . . .. The legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act 
shows that Congress also had in mind and repeatedly focused on the more 
subtle hazards that arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the business of 
act 111 g as fiducIary or managing agent and enters the investment banking busi-
~ess eIther dIrectly or by establishing an affiliate to hold and sell particular 
IIlvestments. 
" [d. at 636. The court stated: "From the perspective of competition, convenience, and 
expertIse there are arguments to b d ' f' . 
. ' e ma e 111 support 0 allowmg commerCIal banks to enter 
the IIlvestment banking business." fd . 
IC' [d. at 630. The Court stated: 
The Glass-Steagall Act I' fl t d d '. 
. e ec e a etermmatlon that policies of competition, 
convemence 01' expertise wh ' h . h h . 
' . IC mIg tot erwlse support the entry of commer-cl~1 ~anks ,I,nto the investment banking business were outweighed by the "haz-
aI ds and financIal dangers" th ' . h . 
, .. . at arIse w en commerCIal banks engage in the 
actIVItIes proscnbed by the Act. 
[d, 
II See C. GOLEMBE & D H F (1986). . OLLAND, EDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 1986-87,275 
12 DiLorenzo, Public ConE;dence i /I B k' 
ration of Comme1'cial a d [~. n I.e an mg System: The Policy Basis for Continued Sepa-
n nvestment Bankmg 35 AM U L R 647 65 6 h h 
noted that the polic b h' d th ,'. . " EV. , 5 (198 ). T e aut or 
restrictions on perm~ssebl mb ke protectIve envIronment is a justification for governmental 
I e an actIvItIes. Id . 
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individual banks from experiencing financial difficulty will keep the 
monetary system stable. 13 
Safety and soundness considerations in banking regulation are 
vital because depository institutions are conduits of money and 
suppli:rs ?f credit in the economy. 14 The Federal Reserve attempts 
to mamtam a stable money supply by controlling the quantity of 
money in the economy.1 5 Banks, in their intermediary capacity, 
receive demand deposits and invest or loan that money to other 
parties. 16 The money a bank loans out is deposited in another bank, 
and that bank then has new money to loan or invest. ' 7 This is how 
banks are said to "create" money. The complexities of the payment 
system, which include check clearing a nd electronic funds transfers, 
also make the safety and soundness of banks essential. ls The mon-
etary function of banks is affected with the public interest, and thus 
banks have been regulated much like public agencies. 19 
Banks are also vital to the economy as suppliers of credit.20 
Congress has kept commercial and investment banking separate not 
only to maintain safety and soundness, but also to assure neutrality 
in the granting of credit to competing borrowers in society.21 If 
" [d. at 51. 
"See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE fEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE f EDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND fUNCTIONS 1-2 (7th ed . 1985) [hereinafter PURPOSES & fUNCTIONS) . 
.. See id. at 13-15 for an overview of how the federal Reserve implements monetary 
policy by controlling the money supply; see also Smith, The i nstruments of General Monetary 
COlltrol, in MONEY, BAN KIN G, AND MONETARY POLICY: READINGS IN DOM ESTIC AND INTERNA-
TIONAL POLICY 200 (H . Williams & H. Woudenberg eds. 1970). According to Smith , the 
Federal Reserve System utilizes three main instruments of monetary comrol: the power to 
purchase and sell securities on the open market; the ability to fix discount rates and regu late 
member bank borrowing in o ther ways; and the a u tho rity to a lte r reserve requirements of 
member banks. ld. 
16 See E. SYMONS, JR. & J. WHITE, B ANKING LAW TEACHING MATERIALS 50 (2d ed. 1984) . 
" ld. 
"See generally PURPOSES & fUNCTIONS supra note 13, a t 105-10; see also Haywood, 
Regulatioll, Structure, and Technological Clwnge in the Consumer Financial ServIces lndust1"y, tn 
REGULATION OF CONSUMER fiNANCIAL SERVICES 163, 163- 67 (A. H eggestad ed. 198 1) for an 
interesting discussion of the impact tha t the r egulatory structure and techno logical changes 
in the financial services industry have o n one a nothe r. According to H aywood, :'[o)ver the 
past thirt), years, the productio n and distribution of financial services h~s been stgl1lficantly 
affected by technological improvemems in d ata processing, commUnIca tions, transportation, 
and organization, as well as by innovations in financial services and tnstruments. l d. a.t 163 . 
19 Shull, The Sepamtion of Banking and Commene: Origin, Development, and hnpltcatlO1lS [ or 
Antitrust, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 255,271 ( 1983); see also DiLorenzo, supra note 12, at 6:>8. 
. k . d d to bolSler DILorenzo noted that the t-egulatory stru cture imposed on ban s was mten e 
public confidence a nd avoid the widespread withdrawal of d epOSits. 
20 See GOLEMBt: & HOLLA ND, supra note II , at 2 75 . 
2t See SYMONS, JR. & WHITE, sutJra nOle 16, at 172. 
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banks did not grant credit neutrally, it could disrupt the natural 
. . ? ? forces of the pnvate economIC system.--
Congress and regulators achieve a safe and sound banking 
system in part through efforts to. prevent bank f~ilures.23, Bec.ause 
of its credit and monetary functions, a commercial bank s fai lure 
can disrupt the economy.24 A bank failure may also damage a risk-
sensitive public's confidence in the banking system.25 It is essential 
that the public perceive banks as safe in titutions in which to deposit 
funds, for if banks could not attract deposits, then the Federal 
Reserve would be unable to utilize banks in its efforts to stabilize 
the economy.26 In separating commercial from investment banking, 
the framers of Glass-Steagall reacted to the bank fai lu res of their 
era.27 With bank failures on the upswing since 1982, regulators and 
legislators again are focusing attention on this problem.28 
Safety and soundness considerations are aimed at protecting 
the integrity of the system.29 Only recently has Congress enacted 
consumer protection laws relating to individual depositors.3o Before 
that, regulators relied upon competition among financial institu-
tions to assure fair prices and convenient services for the public.31 
Maintaining a reasonably competitive market especially helps to 
mobilize credit. 32 
22 ld. 
23 See GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note II, at 10. 
2·, See id: at 8; s~e also DiLorenzo, supra nOle 12, at 648. According to DiLorenzo, public 
confidence m bankmg should be the focus of the policy debate over whether to maintain 
separation betw.een commercial and investme nt banking. The author stated that analyzing 
the pr~blem with public confidence in mind "leads to the conclusion that unwaivering 
separation of commercial and investment banking is the wisest course of action for Congress 
and the courts." Id. 
2' See generally Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 
BANKING L.J. 483, 497 (1971). 
26 See supm notes 15-1 9 and ac . C . • 
2- ' companYlllg text lor a diSCUSSIon of the monetary system. 
' See lanm, supra note 4, at 103-05. 
2. See Moskowitz, Why Banks Fail, II Bus. & SOCIETY REv. 53 53-55 (1988). In 1982 
there were forty-two com . I b k C '1 ' . ' 
. merCia an lal ures m the Umted States while in 1987 there were 
one-hundred-elghty-fou r fai lure Id t 54 M k ' . ' . . 
.. Id f h ' d s. . a . os OWltz pomted out that banks sull fa ll the 
I~ - ~~ I~ne k w~y." That is, they fail through managerial incompetence and director neglect. 
b . a: d " os oWltz listed a number of factors that lead to bank failures such as uninformed 
an IreClOrs, poor loan policies inad . ' 
d . I' . ,equate systems to ensure compliance with bank laws an mterna poliCies overly aggr' d . 
d . . ' - esslve an excessively growth-minded directors and man-agers, an mSlder abuse and fra d ld · is G 
29 See generally id. at 276. u. ., see a 0 OLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note II, at 116. 
>0 Id. at 81. 
" ld. at91. 
32 Id. at 275. 
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Promoting competition in the financial services industry, how-
ever, conflicts to some extent with maintaining a safe and sound 
banking system.33 It is natural in a competitive market that the more 
efficient actors drive the 'less efficient ones out of business.34 Thus, 
when regulators, legislators or the courts decide to increase com-
mercial bank competitiveness, they infringe on the safety and 
soundness consideration of preventing bank failures. 35 As the Su-
preme Court noted, Congress emphasized the importa,nce of safety 
and soundness above a policy of competition in enacting Glass-
Steagall. 36 
Regulators and the judiciary alike heard little debate over Glass-
Steagall for the first thirty years of its existence.37 Rapid changes in 
the financial industry, however, including the expansion of thrift 
institution services,38 the appearance of bank holding companies,39 
and inflation and high interest rates, catapulted financial institutions 
into a more competitive environment. 4o As a result of Glass-Stea-
gall's restraints o!,! commercial banks, investment banks and other 
intermediaries came forth to fill the void.41 Investment banks of-
fered many new products, and also offered products that resembled 
traditional commercial banking services such as deposit-type secu-
rities and consumer credit cards.42 The growth of a global economy 
also served to heighten competition on the internationalleve1.43 In 
this atmosphere, commercial banks became more aggressive in their 
pursuit of securities-related profits traditionally associated with in-
vestment banking.44 Thus, the prohibitions Glass-Steagall placed 
"See SVMONS, JR. & WHITE, supra note 16, at 80. 
>4 [d. 
" See id. 
36 Camp, 40 1 U .S. at 630. 
11 Norton, supra note 3, at 334. 
38 Savings banks, savings and loans associations and credit unions are often called 
"thrifts." These institutions have operated for many years as depository institutions. Thrifts, 
however, have been given authority to issue the equivalent of checking accounts and have 
become multi-purpose lenders. See GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 11 , at 9-11. 
~9 For purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (as amended I ?70), a bank 
holding company is any company that directly or indirectly owns or controls, WIth power to 
vote, more than five percent of the voting shares of each of one or more banks. 12 U .S.c. 
§ 1841(a)(I982). 
<0 Note, Class-Steagall: A Pt'oposal for Regulation Rather Than Prohibition, 47 ALB. L. REV. 
1378, 1378 (1983). 
<\ Fischer, supra note 5, at 470 . 
., ld . 
.. See Woody, The International Implications of Deregulating the U.S. Banking Industry , 31 
AM. U.L. REv. 25, 25-26 (1981) . 
.. See Phelps & Spedale, Reinterpreting Glass-Steagall: A Bank's Move Into Brokerage, 122 
TR. & EST. 17,17 (Nov. 1983). 
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upon bank securities activities became the focus of increased liti-
gation. 45 
In recent years banks have been successful in petitioning the 
regulators and the courts to expand the types of securities activities 
that banks may undertake.46 One organization displeased over such 
developments is the Securities Industry Association (SIA), a trade 
association of underwriters, brokers and securities dealers.47 SIA 
seeks to protect its securities domain from further commercial bank 
encroachment.48 Many of SIA's arguments against securities activity 
by commercial banks are based upon notions of safety and sound-
ness.49 
A 1987 decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, Securities Industry Association v. BoaTd of 
Governors (NatWest),50 holding that a bank's subsidiary could offer 
both discount brokerage51 and investment advice52 to its customers, 
fueled the Glass-Steagall debate over the separation of banking and 
securities. By permitting such a combination of services, the NatWest 
court narrowed Glass-Steagall's limitations further than previous 
decisions. 
" , See infm notes 93- 162 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases interpreting 
Glass-Steagall. 
.<; See illfm notes 123-43, 154-162, 172-218 and accompanying text;see also DiLorenzo, 
~upm note 12, at 678. The author ma intained that advocates of joining commercial and 
IIlvestment banklOg should have the burden of showing that the combination of activities 
would result in p~blic advantages that significantly override any risk of loss. 
. "See Securltles Industry Association, Bank Securities Activities: Memorandum for Study and 
DlscllSSlon, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751 (1977), for the group's position on the appropriateness 
of bank-sponsored securities activities. 
Id. 
·1. See id. at 758-59. SIA commented : 
Because of their importance as financia l intermediaries, banks have been ac· 
corded a variety of privileges designed to reduce their costs of intermediation 
... . [IJt would be highly unfair to expect non-banking entities [0 compete with 
banks 10 busmesses other than banking without the benefit of such privileges. 
' · Id. at 790-91. 
:~ ~~I F.2d 810 (D.C.: Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Cl. 697 ( 1988). 
ote, A Banke! s Adventures In Brokerland: Looking Through Glass-Steagall at Discount 
BI~ok~rag~ Se11JflCfi~S, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1498, 1498 (1983). Discount brokerage dates from the 
e Immatlon 0 xed brokerage ". 197 
I . . . . commISSIOns 10 5. Though the term "discount brokerage" las no slllgie definItIOn ItS focu . '" .. 
d . ,s IS on executmg chent-lOllJated orders. By acting only as agents , Iscount brokers can charge -h I I . mue ower rates than full-service brokers who typically, 
emp oy research staffs offer mvestme t d . d d I ' ' Id. at 1498-99.' n a vIce an ea 10 securities for their own accounts . 
.. The Investmem Company A t f 1940 d fi 
who directly or tl h bl' . c 0 e nes an investment advisor as ,any person 
, lroug pu lCatlons and fo c . d 
of securities or a t h d' .. ' r ompensalIon, a vises others as to the value SOt e a vlsablhty of bu . II' . . § 2(20)( I 982). ylllg or se 109 seCUritles. 15 U .s.C. § 80a-
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!h~s case note examines NatWe!t in light of its place in the 
conunumg debate over the separatIon of commercial and invest-
ment banking> paying sI?ecial attention to the conflicting policies 
~nv~l~ed: SectIon I. examu:es Glas.s-.Stea~all's legislative history and 
JudICIal mterpretatIon of Its provisions.::>3 Section II delineates the 
reasoning of the NatWest opinion.5 4 Section III analyzes the court's 
reasoning, including its implicit policy choices. 55 This casenote con-
cludes that the NatWest court's expansive .view of commercial bank 
powers in the securities area represents a potentially dangerous 
determination that a policy of strengthening the competitive posi-
tion of banks is more important than a safe and sound banking 
system. 
I. GROWTH OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL DEBATE 
Congress enacted the Banking Act of 1933 as a piece of emer-
gency legislation during the first one hundred days of the New 
Deal,56 Congress developed the Glass-Steagall provisions in response 
to commercial bank abuses in the securities field. 57 The Act's legis-
lative history indicates that congressional leaders believed banks to 
have a fiduciary obligation to their depositors.58 The congressional 
viewpoint arose from a recognition that banks' operational funds 
did not flow from equity markets, but from depositors' savings. 59 
One particular abuse of depositor funds that heightened public 
opinion against the securities affiliate system was the failure of the 
Bank of the United States in December 1930.60 Causing the failure 
was the bank president's appropriation of bank funds for his own 
speculative investments. When the bank finally closed its doors, the 
bank had over $200 million of deposits, many belonging to immi-
grants who falsely believed that the bank's name meant that it was 
'3 See infra notes 56-170 and accompanying text. 
'>4 See infra notes 172-218 and accompanying text. 
55 See infra notes 219-45 and accompanying text. 
;0 Perkins, supra note 25, at 483. 
51 Comment, Federal Regulation Securities Activities: Will Congress Allow Glass-Steagall to be 
Shattered?, 12 J. CONTEMP. L. 99, 99-100 (1986). 
5. DiLorenzo, supra note 12, at 655 . Congressman Steagall, who co-sponsored the Glass-
Steagall Act, stated that the "purpose of this legislation is to protect the people of the Umted 
States in the right to have banks in which their deposits will be safe." 77 CONGo ~:c. 3,837 
(1933). Steagall also stated that citizens should be able to "place their hard earnln~s In banks 
"with reasonable expectation of being able to get them out again upon demand. [d. 
59 DiLorenzo, supra note 12, at 655. 
6i) Perkins, supra note 25 , at 496-97. 
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connected to the national government.61 Legislators blamed this and 
other such wrongdoings for the financial collapse leading to the 
Depression.62 
Although Glass-Steagall placed a form idable barrier between 
commercial and investment banking, there remained some accepted 
overlap.63 For example, commercial banks are permitted to buy and 
sell securities on the order of their custo mers, to underwrite certain 
government obligations and to purchase in,:,e~~ment securities for 
their own accounts. 64 Trust department aCtIVlttes are another ex-
ample of commercial banks' power to perform certain securities 
functions. 65 
Prior to the enactment of Glass-Steagall , state banks directly 
sold and underwrote securities, while orne national banks set up 
affiliates through which to perform such activities.66 In the late 
1920s, due to a decline in loan demand, commercial banks inten-
sified their securities efforts as an alternative profit source.67 By 
1930 commercial banks and their affiliates dominated the invest-
ment banking field. 68 
After the stock market crash of 1929 and its accompanying 
bank failures, congressional investigations revealed that some com-
mercial banks utilized depositors' funds directly in securities trans-
actions.59 Congress uncovered such abuses as the extension of un-
sound loans and the dissemination of biased investment advice in 
order to bolster securities in which banks had an investment.7o 
Unsound loans also went to SeCUrItles affiliates of commercial 
banks.71 The public became aware of certain securities-related 
Ol l d. 
02 Board ofCovernors v. Investment Co. lnst. (I C I), 450 U.S. 46, 63 (198 1). 
~.' Norton, supra note 3, at 327; see also Fischer, supra note 5, al 469. The authors noted 
thaI [c)ommerClal banks have engaged in some securities activities throughout virtually their 
entIre hIstory. T he panicular type of activity has changed through time de pending upon 
fede:a l and . state legislatures, the courts, a nd . .. the extent to which banks are aggressive 
and II1novauve . . .. " Id. 
r" 12 U.S.c. § 24 (Seventh). 
65 See Comment, Fiduciary DUly of Bank T rust Departments: Whose Profit is it Anyway?, 5 
ANN . R EV. BANKING L 33" 339 (1986) A . 
. .:J, . t common law, the most fundamental fidUCIary 
dULY of a fidUCIary was to mainta' I I I ' .. 
dh III comp ete oya ty to the bene fiCI ary. Traditionally courts a ered to a no self-dealing I ' . ' fi ru e, reJecung arguments that a trustee should be able to keep 
pro IS made at the expense of a beneficiary. Id. 
66 See Perkins, supra note 25, at 488-89. 
07 Id. at 493 . 
.. Id. al 495. 
69 Note, supra note 40, at 138 1-82. 
7° Id. al 1382. 
71I d. 
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abuses involving affiliates.72 In this atmosphere of public mistrust 
of affiliates involved with investment activity, Senator Glass pushed 
through his effort to separate commercial from investment bank-
ing.73 
Congress sou~ht to impleme~t three main objectives in passing 
Glass-Steagall.74 First, Congress mtended to restore public confi-
dence in banking following the financial disasters connected with 
the Depression. 75 Second, Congress sought to increase the neutrality 
of advice a bank gives its customers by avoiding potential conflicts 
of interest between commercial and investment banking opera-
tions.76 Finally, Congress intended to protect and maintain the fi-
nancial soundness of commercial banking by preventing unsound 
and imprudent investment. 77 
The Act's framers recognized the traditional notion that com-
mercial and investment banking were separate activities . Glass-Stea-
gall defines commercial banking to include making loans and taking 
deposits. 78 Glass-Steagall defines investment banking as "the busi-
ness of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale 
or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, deben-
tures, notes or other securities .... "79 Commercial banking is dis-
tinct from investment banking because an investment generally is 
of a more permanent nature, and credit in the form of stocks and 
bonds is of a longer duration. Also, a deposit with an investment 
bank is a special deposit for a particular purpose, which differs 
from a general deposit. Thus, the relationship an investment bank 
establishes with its customers resembles agency more than the usual 
creditor-debtor relationship involved in commercial banking.80 
Four major sections of Glass-Steagall govern the relationship 
between banking and securities.8 ! In general, these provisions cre-
72 See Perkins, supra note 25, at 496-97. . 
73 See id. at 497-526 for a discussion of Glass's efforts LO separate commerCIal from 
investment banking . 
.. See Comment, supra nOte 57, at 105. 
7; See Plotkin , supra note 6, at 407. . 
1s ld.; see also Hunsicker, Conflicts of Interest, Economic Distortions, arul the Separatwn ofTmst 
and Commercial Banking Functions, 50 S'. CAL. L. REv . 6 11 (1977). Information made avatlable 
to the bank's commercial loan department could aid a bank's trust department or seCUrIt.les 
affiliate in its investment decisions. Id. at 630-31 . 
17 Plotkin, supra note 6 at 407 . 
78 SYMONS, JR. & WHITE:, supra note 16 , at 434. 
,. Id. 
8() Id, 
81 12 U,S.C. § 24 (Seventh), 78, 377, 378, 
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ated a barrier between commercial and investment banking.82 Sec-
tion 16 of Glass-Steagall limits member bank securities transactions 
to those carried out for the accounts of bank customers.83 Section 
20 prohibits member banks from affiliating with organizations "en-
gaged principally" in the investment banking business. 84 ~lass-Stea­
gall's section 21 prohibits securities dealers fro~ acceptmg de~os­
its.85 The final provision of Glass-Steagall, sectIOn 32, proscnbes 
interlocking managements between member banks and firms "pri-
marily engaged" in the securities busines .86 
Because Glass-Steagall applies only to bank, its provisions 
could be avoided by organizations that formed bank holding com-
panies. 87 By the early 1950s many banks became involved in activ-
ities prohibited by Glass-Steagall by organizing into bank holding 
82 Norton, supm note 3, at 334 . 
• , Section 16 of Class-Steagall is codifled at 12 U.S.c. § 24 (Seventh), which provides in 
percinent part that: 
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the assoc iation sha ll be limited 
to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon 
the orders and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, 
and the association shall not undenVl'ite any issues of securities of stock; Pro-
vided , That the association may purchase for its own account investment secu-
rities under such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the Currency 
may by regulation prescribe . ... The limitations and restrictions herein con-
tained as to dealing in, underwriting, and purchasing for its own account 
investment securities shall not ap ply to obligations of the Un ited States, or 
general obligations of any State or of any political subdivision thereof .... 
84 Section 20 of Class-Steagall is cod ified at 12 U.S .c. § 377, which provides in pertinent 
part that: 
No membel' bank shall be affiliated in any manner described in ... this title 
with any corpOl'atio~, association, business U'ust, or other sim ilar organization 
en~aged prlllCipally III the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distri-
butIOn at wholesale or retail or through syndicate panicipation of stocks, bonds, 
debentul'es, notes, or o ther securities .... 
85 Secti~n 21 of C lass-Steagall is codified at 12 USC. § 378, which provides in pertinent 
pan that It IS unlawfu l for: 
any person , firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar 01'-
gamzatlon, eng~ged in the business of issuing, underwrit ing, selling or distrib-
uting ... seCuntles, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the 
busmess of recelvmg deposits . . .. 
86 Section 32 of C lass-Steagall is cod ified a t 12 U .S.c. § 78, which provides in pertinent 
pan that: 
o officel' director o r emplo f '. . 
. ' , yee 0 any corporation or unmcorporated assoCI-
ation, no partner or eml) I()yee of I . .. . .. 
' . . any partners lip, and no mdlvldual. pnmanly 
engaged III the Issue , AotaLJon , underwriting, public sale, or distribution ... of 
secunlles, shall serve a t the same time as an officer d' I f' b . , I rector, or emp oyee 0 
acn y mem er bank except m limited classes of cases in which the Board of 
overnors of the Federal Rese' S 
. I ve ystem may allow slIch service by general 
regulatJons . . .. 
87 See Boal'd of Co I 
vernors v. nveSlment Co. Insl. (lCI), 450 U.S. 46, 58 n.24 (1981). 
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companies.ss To address this problem, Congress enacted the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA).89 Congress intended 
BHCA to prevent undue concentrations of resources and to protect 
against un~afe c~nnections. ~etwee~ ?~nks and other non-banking 
ventures, mdudmg seCUrities actIvltIes. 90 The 1956 version of 
BHCA applied only to companies holding two or more banks.91 
Congress strengthened its control over bank holding companies by 
amending BHCA in 1970 to include one-bank holding companies.92 
Thus, by 1970 all bank holding companies moved under the um-
brella of safe and sound banking. 
Cases interpreting Glass-Steagall illuminate the policy consid-
erations at stake in the separation between banking and securities. 
The first case to interpret Glass-Steagall was the 1947 case of Board 
of Governors v. Agnew,93 in which the Supreme Court upheld a Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) decision to 
remove bank directors who were also employed by a firm "primarily 
engaged" in securities underwriting.94 In Agnew, directors of a na-
tional bank also maintained employment at a securities firm, which 
the directors claimed was not "primarily engaged" in underwriting 
activity because less than fifty percent of its income was derived in 
that manner. The Agnew Court stated that underwriting needed 
only to be a "substantial" activity of a firm to bring it under Glass-
Steagall's section 32, not the chief or principal activity.95 
88 Note. Avoiding the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company Acts: An Option for Banlt 
Product Expansion. 59 IND. LJ. 89. 106 (1983) . 
89 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
90 See id. § 1843(c)(8). In hearings on the BHeA Amendments of 1970. the Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve Board stated: 
Considerations of safety and soundness reinforce the policy of separating bank-
ing and other businesses. A bank should be insulated from pressures that might 
lead it to favor customers of affiliated businesses in its credit decisions. Other-
wise. the bank might build an unbalanced loan portfolio by discountin? an 
excessive amount of obligations of such customers, or a low-qualIty port~olIo by 
accepting substandard risks to foster sales to such customers . An essential part 
of the traditions of bank ma nage ment has been a scrupulous o~servance of the 
need for prudence in handling funds entrusted to the bank by Its customers; If 
management were to become oriented toward the different objectives of other 
businesses, this tradition cOlild be seriously weakened . 
Hearings on H.R. 6778 before the House Comm . on Banking and ~U1-rency. 91st Cong .• 1st Sess. 
197 (I969)(statements of William McChesney Martin . Jr .• Chairman of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System). 
9, See Note. supra note 88. at 94. 
92 ld. 
"' 329 U.S. 441 (1947) . 
!k Id. at 446. 
9, Id. 
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In deciding the case, the Agnew C~urt loo.ked back t~ the prac-
tices of the 1920's in which a bank director IOterested 10 the un-
derwriting business might wield his or her inAuen~~ in the bank to 
involve it in securities in which his or her underwntlOg firm had an 
investment. 96 The likelihood of such a scenario repeating itself, the 
court stated, did not depend on whether the underwriting activity 
exceeded a certain percentage of its business.97 The Agnew Court 
noted that Congress intended Glass-Steagall as a "prophylactic mea-
sure" against potential conflicts of interest.98 The decision thus dem-
onstrated the Court's early wi l1ingness to enforce strictly the sepa-
ration of commercial and investment banking created by Glass-
Steagall. 
1 wenty-four years after Agnew, in Investment Co. Institute v. 
Camp, the Supreme Court continued to maintain the barrier be-
tween banking and securities.99 The Camp Court held that open-
end collective investment funds of the type proposed were like 
mutual funds, the a le of which was forbidden by section 16 of 
Glass-Steagall. 100 The Court concluded that a llowing a bank to man-
age a collective investment fund as an inve tment advisor would 
violate the congressional intent in passing Glass-Steagall. lol 
The Camp decision is significant for its detailed discussion of 
the policies underlying Congress's enactment of Glass-Steagall.The 
"subtle hazards"lo2 analysis set forth by the Camp Court remains an 
essential component of judicial interpretation of Glass-Steagall. lo3 
According to the Court, Congress believed that the promotional 
pressures of investment banking and the investment banker's pe-
cuniary stake in the success of a particular investment opportunity 
endangered safe, sound and disinterested commercial banking 
practices. l04 Such hazardous activities, explained the Court, could 
destroy public confidence in the banking system. IDS The Camp Court 
g6 ld. a t 447. 
"7 Id. 
9H ld. a t 449. 
O'J 401 U.S. 6 17 ( 1971). 
100 See id. at 639, 624-25. 
10 1 Id. a t 639. 
102 See Sl/,11ra note 8 for a statement of the subtle hazards 
10, See infra note 210 and accompanying text. . 
104 Cam!}, 40 I U.S. at 634. 
10; Id. ; see also DiLor I .' 1 . 2 I I I e lZO, SU. 71a note 1 , a t 66] n.60. A survey by Reichman Research, 
nCo revea ec several factors tha t could . . bl' fi 
'd f ' ' fi Impa Ir pu IC con dence in the banking system. In 
0 1 er 0 Slglll -.ca nce they were' (]) th f ' l f . . .. 
b d . . e a l ure 0 many banks (2) economIc rnstabllrty; (3) an a un ance of money loaned to fo . . ' . b k ' reIgn COuntrres; (4) hIgh rnterest rates on loans' and (5) 
an ' rncompelence and poor management. Id . ' 
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stated that Glass-Steagall represented a Congressional determina-
tion that the ha~ards ass~ciated with commercial bank entry into 
investment bankmg outweIghed any possible competitive benefits. 106 
The Court concluded that Congress sought to avoid the obvious 
danger that a bank might unwisely invest its own assets in securi-
ties. ,o7 The Court also noted , however, that Congress focused its 
attention on the potential for subtle hazards. These hazards, the 
Court stated, arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the busi-
ness of acting as a managing agent or as a fiduciary, and enters 
investment banking directly or establishes affiliates to deal in secu-
rities. \08 
The Camp Court outlined a number of subtle hazards. 109 The 
Court noted that entering the investment banking business places 
new "promotional and other pressures" on a commercial bank, thus 
leading to certain "temptations.""o According to the Court, when a 
bank and its affiliate are linked in the public mind and the affiliate 
does not perform satisfactorily, the public will lose confidence in 
the bank. III The Court postulated that because public confidence is 
necessary for bank solvency, the natural temptation for a bank 
might be to support the affiliate through unsound loans. 112 The 
Camp Court further noted that the pressure to sell a particular 
investment and to bolster an affiliate might tempt the bank to make 
its credit facilities more readily available to companies in which the 
affiliate had invested. The Court shared Congress's fear that a 
bank's salesperson's interest might impair its ability to operate as an 
unbiased credit source . 113 
According to the Camp opinion, another subtle hazard Congress 
foresaw was that bank depositors might suffer losses made on in-
vestments made in reliance on the connection between the bank 
and its affiliate. I 14 The consequent loss of customer goodwill, the 
Court noted, might damage the particular bank's reputation and 
ability to perform well in a deflated securities market. 115 Congress 
10<; [d. at 630. 
107 [d. 
I08Id. 
I!19 1d. at 630-38. 
110 [d. at 630-31. 
III [d. at 63l. 
11 21d 
"' ld: See supra notes 22- 23 and accompanying lext for a discussion of neutrality in 
credit-granting. 
11·401 U.S. al 63l. 
II; ld. 
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believed, the Camp Court explained, that it would be improper for 
banks to lend their reputations for "prudence and restraint" to the 
business of inherently risky securities affiliates. I 16 The Court also 
pointed out Congress's concern that banks might be tem~t~d to 
provide loans to customers to enable them to purchase secuntJes.~17 
According to the Court, Congress sought to prevent commerCial 
banking facilities and talent from being diverted into speculative 
activities. I 18 
The Camp Court listed conflicts between the promotional inter-
est of the investment banker and the commercial banker's duty to 
render unbiased investment advice as another subtle hazard Con-
gress contemplated. I 19 Congress collected evidence indicating that 
security affiliates might unload excessive holdings through the 
bank's trust department. Such activity, the Court noted, might con-
stitute self-dealing and violate a trustee 's fiduciary duty. 120 
The Court contrasted the traditional services commercial banks 
provided with those offered by investment banks and found that 
sl:btle hazards are not present when a bank purchases stock for its 
customers' accounts or commingles assets that it handles in a fidu-
ciary capacity. 121 Such activities, the Court stated, unlike the oper-
ation of an investment fund, do not give rise to a "salesman's stake" 
in a particular investment because they do not cause a bank to 
compete with funds promoted by other investment companies, do 
not weaken public confidence in banking, and do not affect a bank's 
ability to advise a customer disinterestedly. The Court thus con-
cluded that there was a "plain difference" between selling invest-
ments and selling fiduciary services. 122 
Ten years after Camp, in 1981, in Board of Governors v. Investment 
Co. lnstztut~ (ICI) , the Court upheld a regulation that permitted a 
?ank holdmg ~ompany and its non-bank subsidiary to act as an 
Investment adVIsor to a closed-end investment company. 123 leI chal-
lenged the Board's amendment to Regulation Y,124 an amendment 
that enlarged the categories of activities it would regard as "closely 
IIG ld. a t 63 1-32. 
' " Id. a t 632. 
Ii s i d. 
11 9 1d. a t 633. 
12° ld. 
12 1 Id. a t 638. 
122 ld. 
123 450 U .S. 46, 78 (198 1). 
124 12 C. F. R. § 225. The regulation incl d r f " ., .. 
in which bank holdin co' u. es a .,st 0 permissible non-bankmg actlVlUes 
g mpanles may participate directly or through an affi lia te. [d. 
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related': to banki~g ~nd~r BHCA.1 25 The Board issued an interpre-
tive ruhng that dIstmguIshed the open-end investment companies 
prohibited in Camp from the closed-end investment companies al-
lowed under Regulation y'1 26 The Board believed, and the leI 
Court agreed, that a bank subsidiary could offer closed-end funds 
without violating Glass-Steagall's section 20. 127 
In upholding the regulation, the Court explained that Congress 
intended BHCA to maintain and strengthen Glass-Steagall's sepa-
ration between commercial and investment banking. 128 In fact, the 
Court noted, the 1956 version of BHCA operated to close a loop-
hole that bank holding companies had been using to avoid Glass-
Steagall restrictions. 129 Although leI represented a more expansive 
view of permissible securities activities by banks, the Court reiter-
ated the notion that Glass-Steagall and BHCA work together to 
maintain a division between commercial and investment banking. 
In 1984, three years after leI, in Securities Industry Association v. 
Board of Governors (Schwab),1 30 the Supreme Court upheld another 
Board decision allowing a bank holding company to acquire a non-
bank affiliate engaged principally in discount securities broker-
age. 13l The Board determined, and the Court agreed, that banks' 
use of sophisticated resources and techniques to execute buy and 
sell orders for customers was widespread enough to support a find-
125 BHeA's genera l ban on bank holding company ownership or control of non-banking 
entities does not apply to the following: 
shares of any company the activity of which the Board after due notice and 
opportunity for hearing has determined (by order or regulatioo) to be so closely 
related 1O banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident 
thereto . ... In determining whether a panicular aetivity is a proper incident 
to banking or managing or controlling banks the Board shall consider whether 
its perform ance by an affi liate of a holding company can reaso nably be expected 
to produce benefits to the public such as greater convenience, increased com-
petition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse affects, such as 
undue concentrations of resources, decreased or unfair competitIOn, confhcts 
of interest, or unsound banking practices. 
12 U.S.c. § I 843(4)(c)(8). ., 
". The Board expla ined that an "open-end" investment company or "mutual fund 
di frers from a closed-end investment company. An open-e nd company IS typICally engaged 
on a continuous basis in issu ing its shares and stands ready to redeem the securities: A closed-
end company typically does not issue shares after its initial organization , except on ll1!requent 
occasions, and does not stand ready to redeem its shares . 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(c). 
' 27 450 U.S. at 78. 
l2S ld. at 69. 
' ~· ld. at 70 . 
13° 468 U.S. 207 (1984) . 
' 3[ ld. at 221. 
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ing that banks are sufficiently equipped to pro~i.de such services.132 
The Court shared the Board's view that traditIOnal trust services 
were identical to the services offered by Schwab. The Board held, 
and the Court agreed, that Schwab's business of o~fering discount 
brokerage, without the provision of investment advICe, was "closely 
related" to banking within the meaning of BHCA.'33 
The Court acknowledged that section 20 of Glass-Steagall pro-
hibits member banks from affiliating with any corporation "engaged 
principally in the issue, flotation , underwriting, public sale or dis-
tribution" of securities . '34 The Schwab Court stated that the term 
"public sale" should be read in conjunction with its surrounding 
terms.135 Discount brokerage, the Court observed, did not fall within 
the definition of "public sale."136 Schwab, the Court stated, would 
not engage in those activities normally associated with the under-
writing activities enumerated in section 20. 137 This was so, the Court 
explained, because while an underwriter usually acted as a principal, 
a broker executed orders as an agenL I3B 
Although the Schwab Court held that discount brokerage was 
not within the literal terms of Glass-Steagall, it nonetheless consid-
ered the subtle hazards analysis. 139 The Court maintained that none 
of the subtle hazards wou ld be implicated by discount brokerage 
services. 140 The Court reasoned that because Schwab traded as an 
agent, its assets were not subject to the vagaries of the securities 
markets. '41 Schwab's profits, the Court stated, were dependent on 
the volume of shares traded and not on the purchase or sale of 
partICular securities. Thus, the Court concluded, the affiliated bank 
wou ld have no "salesman's stake" in the securities Schwab traded. 142 
The Schwab decision demonstrated that the judiciary was willing 
to accept s?~e erosion of the Glass-Steagall barrier between banking 
and s.e:untles. The Court viewed discount brokerage, although a 
secuntles-related activity, as the same type of service that banks 
132 Id.a l 2 12 . 
'" Id. 
13·, Id. 
135 rd. a t 2 17-1 8. 
"'; rd. at 22 1. 
137 l ei. a t 217. 
13. l ei. a t 2 17- 18. 
139 Id. a t 220-2 1. 
' ·10 Id. a t 220. 
,., Id. 
'.2 Id. 
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could already provide through their trust departments. 143 The de-
cision, while expanding bank powers in the securities area, none-
theless continued to monitor the potential subtle hazards. 
In a decision handed down the same day as Schwab, Securities 
Industry Association v. Board oj Governors (Bankers Trust /),144 the Su-
preme Court held that commercial paper was a "security" within 
Glass-Steagall. 145 The Bankers Trust I Court noted that the term 
"security" should be construed broadly. 146 The Court further main-
tained that the Board's analysis , which concluded that commercial 
paper did not function as a security and therefore was not within 
Glass-Steagall's proscriptions, failed to comprehend Congress's con-
cerns over commercial bank relationships with securities market-
ing.147 
The Court did not agree with the Board that subtle hazards 
were not implicated in the marketing of commercial paper. 148 The 
Court found that in the commercial paper market, where the dis-
tribution of an issue depended upon the credit-worthiness of an 
issuer, a bank could enhance an issue's marketability by giving the 
issuer backup credit. 149 Also , the Court added, a bank competing 
against other commercial paper dealers could feel pressure to buy 
unsold notes to boost its own reputation, even where the paper did 
not meet the bank's usual credit standards. The Bankers Trust / 
Court also found that a bank's commercial paper dealings could 
implicate such other subtle hazards as conflicts of interest and loss 
of depositor goodwill. 150 The Court pointed out that Glass-Steagall's 
prophylactic prohibition of underwriting demonstrated Congress's 
determination that the mere existence of a securities operation, no 
matter how carefully run, was inconsistent with a bank's best inter-
ests. 15 1 
The Bankers Trust I Court remanded the case to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to 
143 1d. at 212. 
144 468 U.S. 137 (1984). . 
1451d. at 139. Commercial paper is first quality, unsecured, short-term promissory nOles 
issued by large corporations lO fund activities. Note, Security Under the. Glass-Steagall Act: 
Anal)'zing the Sup" eme Court's Fm mework f or Dete17nining Permissible Bank Acttvtttes , 70 CORNELL 
L. REv. 1194, 1194 (\ 985) . 
146 Bankers TrUst I , 468 U .S. at i 50. 
147 1d. at 154. 
14s ld. al 155. 
H91d. 
150 /d. at 156. 
15 1 [d. at 157. 
954 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:937 
determine whether commercial paper placement constituted the 
t pe of underwriting Glass-Steagall prohibits. 152 In Securities Industry 
Issociation v. Board of Governors (Bankers Trust II),1 53 the .court of 
appeals held that Bankers Trust's placement o~ c?mmerClal paper 
constituted a "sale" of securities, but was permissible under Glass-
Steagall's section 16. 154 The court so held because the sale of secu-
rities would be executed without recourse and solely upon the order 
and for the account of customers. 155 
The court ruled that, with one exception, Bankers Trust's ac-
tivities would not implicate subtle hazards. 156 The Board had ar-
gued, the court noted, that because commercial paper buyers are 
sophisticated business entities, they would be unlikely to blame a 
bank for what really amounted to their own error in judgment. 
Thus, any resulting harm would not affect the bank's public repu-
tation. 157 
The Bankers Trust II court, though agreeing with the Board's 
discussion of sophisticated business customers, was bound to follow 
the finding of the Supreme Court that the subtle hazard of loss of 
reputation did exist. 158 The court, however, maintained that this 
loss was not sufficient to prohibit Bankers Trust from placing com-
mercial paper. 159 The court delineated a number of reasons for this 
conclusion. First, the court pointed out that a subtle hazards analysis 
had never by itself caused the Supreme Court to hold that Glass-
Steagall prohibited a practice. The analysis of the hazards in pre-
vious cases, the Bankers Trust II court stated, simply reinforced the 
interpretation that Glass-Steagall proscribed or permitted a partic-
I . Ir o S d u ar practICe. ) econ, the court noted, the Supreme Court con-
c.luded that subtle hazards indicated prohibition of a banking prac-
tice. only when such a practice gave rise to each of the hazards. 
Thll-d, stated the court, so long as a bank avoided a hazard "to a 
l~rge extent," the practice may be permitted. 161 Finally, the court 
Viewed the subtle hazards analysis as an instance of the principle 
152 {d. at 160 0 .12. 
153 807 F.2d 1052 (D. C. Cir. 1986). Ce?·t . denied L07 S. Ct. 3228 3228 (1987) 
"·1 {d. at 1055. ' .. 
15; {d. 
156 {d. at 1069. 
157 1 d. 
"3 {d. 
"9 {d. 
160 [d. 
,. , {d. 
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that requires deference to an agency's reasonable construction of 
its statute's ambiguities. 162 
The legislative history and the cases interpreting Glass-Steagall 
demonstrate that Congress, reacting to the financial crisis surround-
ing the Depression, viewed commercial banking ventures in secu-
rities as inherently dangerous to banks and the banking system. 
Through the years, there has been debate over how restrictive 
regulation should be regarding commercial banking securities ac-
tivities. The controversy escalated as banks sought new methods of 
undertaking permissible investment-related activities. 163 Congress 
responded to the situation with deregulatory legislation intended 
to maintain competitiveness among the various types of financial 
institutions. 164 
Deregulation decreased some of the traditional barriers that 
divided banking institutions from non-banking entities. 165 In 1980, 
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
broadened the deregulatory foundation of commercial banks and 
thrifts. 166 In 1982, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions 
Act accelerated the process of deregulation. 167 The draft form con-
tained provisions that would loosen Glass-Steagall's prohibitions, but 
the final bill dispensed with such provisions and focused on helping 
troubled institutions. 16s 
. As Congress ponders changes in the regulatory structure 'of 
banking, it faces the problem of how to enhance the competitive 
16, Id. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) for an enunciation of defe rence principles. The Court stated: 
When a coun reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it adminis-
ters, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether 
Congress has direClly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. 
If, however, the court dete rmines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the coun does not simply impose its o~n constr~ctlon 
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an admmlstratlve mter-
pretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or am biguous with respect ~o the specific 
issue. the question for the court is whether the agency's answer IS based on a 
permissible construction of the statute. 
Id. at 842-43. 
16, See Phelps & Spedale , supra note 44. at 17. 
'''' See Norton . The 1982 Banking Act and the Deregulation Scheme, 38 Bus. LAW. 1627. 
1627 (1983). 
1.5 Id. at 1627-28. 
166 Id. at 1628. 
167Id. at 1630. 
168 Id. 
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position of commercial banks while maintaining a safe and sound 
system. 169 The Glass-Steagall wall, though over fifty years old, is still 
hotly debated. '70 In the midst of the controversy cam~ ~ecurities 
Industry Association v. Board of Governors (Nat West) , an opInIOn that 
should serve to increase the fever of debate. 171 In analyzing the 
NatWest decision, one should be cognizant of how Congress and 
previous courts grappled with the banking policies of safety and 
soundness and competition . 
II. NATWEST COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF GLASS-STEAGALL AND 
THE ROLE OF THE SUBTLE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 
The issue before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was 
whether the Board reasonably concluded that the combination of 
securities brokerage and investment advice by a member bank's 
affiliate did not violate section 20 of Glass-Steagall, which prohibits 
the "public sale" of securities by a deposit-taking institution. 172 The 
court held that the Board reasonably interpreted Glass-Steagall and 
correctly followed precedent. 173 The NatWest court, therefore, de-
nied the petition for review of the Board's order.174 
The petition came before the court of appeals following the 
Board's approval of NatWest's175 1985 application. 176 NatWestsub-
mitted its application pursuant to section 4(c)(8) of BHCA, which 
is an exception to the general prohibition of ownership or control 
by a bank of a non-bank company.177 NatWest proposed to offer 
' 69 See Norton, supra note 3, at 329. 
170 Congressional reform measures again failed to produce a final enactment in 1988. 
See House Rules W ill Not ConsideT Banking Industry Refonn Bill, Uuly-Dec.] Banking Rep. (BNA) 
o. 51 , at 647 . House Speaker Jim Wright, upon realizing that the House would not approve 
~.h e re form bIll, sent a I:tter to Federal Reserve Board Chairman Bud Greenspan stating that 
we WIll take care of thIS matter In the legislative process." Id. 
. The stock market crash of October 19B7 may have impacted on the Congress's failure 
In tha t year to pass legislation amend ing or repealing Glass-Steagall. See Bradley, Banks in No 
Danger, But Thclr Push for New Powers May Be, Christian Sci. Monitor Oct 21 1987 at 32 
col. 4. ' . t J , 
17 1 S . . 
e untIes Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors (NatWest) 821 F.2d BIO (D.C. Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 697 (1988) . ' 
172 I d. at Bl1 . 
In rd. 
". Id. 
175 " NatWest" refers to Nation I W . 
H Id ' 1 a estmmster, Bank PLC and its subsidiary NatWest o mgs, nc. ' 
176 See 821 F.2d at BII-12 nn .3-4. 
17' ld. at 8 11. 
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discount brokerage and inve tment advice through County Services 
Corporation (CSC), anew ly formed su bsidiary. 178 
As outlined by NatWest, CSC's buying and selling of securities 
would be done solely as an agent. 179 CSC would not have discretion 
over customer accounts and would act only upon customer re-
quest. ISO NatWest further provided that CSC would not act as a 
principal or underwriter, and would not bear any financial risk for 
securities it brokered or recommended. 181 According to the appli-
cation, esc would receive compensation for the volume of trans-
actions it carried out for its customers. NatWest also provided that 
it would not share depositor lists or confidential information with 
CSC. NatWest and CSC, stated the application, would maintain 
separate books, records, assets and liabilities. 182 
Based in part upon the commitments NatWest set forth in its 
application, the Board approved the institution's proposals in an 
order dated June 13, 1986. 183 The Board determined that CSC's 
proposed activities were "closely related" to banking and t.hat the 
activities were a "proper incident" 184 to banking within section 
17. Id. 
17. [d. 
I'. [d. at 811-12. 
18 1 [d. at 812 . 
182 1d. 
183 National Westminster Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 584, 595 (1986) [hereinafter National 
Westminster). While NatWest's application was pending, the Board elicited commitments from 
NatWest regarding its relationship with esC's pmposed activities. Those commitments in-
cluded the following: 
The Subsidiary will not transmit its investment advisory research or recommen-
dations to the commercial lending department of any member of the NatWest 
group . . . . In any brokerage transaction performed by the Subsidiary where 
the counterparty (as principal) is a member of the NatWest group, NatWest WIll 
disclose this fact to the brokerage customer and obtain specific consent from 
the customer for such transaction .. . . No director of the Subsidiary wi ll also 
be a director of either atWest PLC, National Westminster Bank USA, N .A . 
. . . or any subsidiary of NatWest USA .... No officer of the Subsidiary .will 
also serve as an officer of either NatWest PLC, NatWest USA or any subSidIary 
of NatWest USA. In addition, no officer of the Subsidiary engaged in providing 
investment advisory or securities brokerage services will a lso pro~ide such ser-
vices for, on behalf of or with respect to any other member of. the NatWest 
group. As noted in the Application . . . the Subsidiary will be ma1l1ta1l1ed, and 
will hold itself out to the public, as a separate and distinct corporate entity, and 
will conduct its business separate from the other members of the NatWest gr?~p 
. .. . The Subsidiary will not refer its cuSLOmers who desire to purchase securities 
on credit to any Affiliate .... [citations omitted] 
NatWest, 821 F.2d at 812 n.4. 
18. See supra note 125. 
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4(c)(8) of BHCA.185 The Board also determined that esC's pro-
posed activities were not proscribed by ~lass-Steagall ~ecause the 
combination of discount brokerage and Investment advICe was not 
a "public sale" of securities under section 20 of that act. 186 
SIA petitioned the court of appeals to review the Board's order, 
arguing that CSC's proposed activities were ,:i~h.in ?lass.-Steagall's 
literal terms. 187 SIA also claimed that the actIVities Implicated the 
subtle hazards that the Supreme Court enunciated in Camp. ISS SIA 
did not challenge the Board's finding that NatWest's proposal met 
the "closely related" and "proper incident" tests in accordance with 
BHCA standards. 189 
The NatWest court, in upholding the Board 's decision and per-
mitting a bank's affiliate to offer brokerage and investment advice, 
divided its reasoning into two main components. First, the court 
considered whether NatWest's proposal violated section 20 of Glass-
Steagall because brokerage and investment advice combined 
amounted to a "public sale" of securities. 190 Second, the court ap-
plied the subtle hazards analysis to NatWest's contemplated activi-
ties. 191 
As a preliminary matter the court reasoned that, because the 
Board comprehensively reviewed Glass-Steagall's section 20 and 
provided a detailed explanation for its findings , the decision was 
entitled to "substantial deference"192 on review. 193 The court stated 
~hat , because Congress has not addressed the specific issue involved 
In NatWest, the Board's interpretation was required to stand if it 
was a "reasonable construction" of Glass-Steagall. 194 
The court first dealt with the question of whether investment 
~dvice combined with brokerage was prohibited by the literal mean-
I~g of the te:n: "public sale" in section 20 of Glass-Steagall. 195 Sec-
~,lon 20 proh~blt~ mem?er banks from affiliating with a corporation 
engaged prinCipally In the issue, flotation, underwriting, public 
I., National Westminster, supra note 202, at 584-91. 
ISti l d. at 592. 
" 7 See Nat West , 82 1 F.2d at 8 13-1 5. 
lss i d. al8 15- 19. 
1.9 Id. at 8 12- 13. 
190 1d. al8 13-15. 
I" l d. at 8 15-1 9. 
192 See supra note 162 a nd a . 
the Ie I r d ~ ccompanymg text for the Supreme Court's enunciation of 
ve 0 e erence to be accorded administrative agencies 
193 NatWest, 82 1 F.2d at 813. . 
1941d. 
195 1d. 
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sale or distribution" of securities. 196 The NatWest court principally 
relied upon the Supreme Court rulings in Schwab and leI in deter-
mining section 20's applicability to the NatWest proposal. The court 
noted that the Schwab Court ruled that discount brokerage did not 
fall within the term "public sale" for Glass-Steagall purposes. 197 The 
court followed Schwab because it found NatWest's proposed activi-
ties similar to Schwab's brokerage services.19B 
The NatWest court then cited leI for the proposition that Glass-
Steagall did not prohibit a bank's affiliate from offering investment 
advice. 199 The court compared N atWest's proposed activities to 
those at issue in leI, and held that both situations involved entities 
providing services on behalf of customers rather than for the ac-
count of the financial institution.20o Though leI dealt with a section 
21 Glass-Steagall question , the NatWest court found the holding 
equally applicable to the facts before it.201 Thus, concluded the 
court, NatWest's proposal to offer investment advice was an act 
already permitted by the Supreme Court. 
Having found that Supreme Court precedent allowed banks to 
undertake the securities-related activities of brokerage and invest-
ment advice, the NatWest court reasoned that the only question 
remaining was whether the combination of these activities brought 
them under Glass-Steagall's section 20 prohibition against public 
sales of securities.202 The court stated that the Board reasonably 
interpreted the term "public sale" in respect to the NatWest pro-
posal.2°3 The court stated that CSC would not act as a principal in 
buying and selling securities. The court also noted that CSC would 
not make a market in securities with its own funds, nor would it act 
as an agent for issuers. In sum, the NatWest court did not see the 
addition of investment advice to brokerage services as implicating 
any of the activities the Schwab Court described as being typically 
associated with underwriting. 204 Though the court state~ that i~­
vestment advice might be a common attribute of un~erwnters, t.hlS 
did not transform CSC's activities into ones proscnbed by sectlOn 
196 12 U.S.C. § 377. 
197 NatWest . 821 F.2d at 813. 
198 1d. at 814. 
199 1d. at 813. 
200 See id. at 813-14. 
201 ld. at 814 n .6 . 
20' [d. at 814. 
20$ ld. 
204 1d. 
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20. 205 The court also maintained that banks traditionally managed 
investments in a fiduciary capacity, and that Glass-Steagall, there-
fore, could not h ave been intended to prohibit such a time-honored 
fu nction . 206 
After refuting SIA's public sale arguments, the court addressed 
the subtle hazards issue. 207 First, however, the NatWest court noted 
that a subtle hazards analysis might not be necessary where the 
activities were not found to fall within Glass-SteagalI's literal 
terms. 208 The court also believed that becau e CSC did not hold 
and sell particular investments, the subtle hazards analysis was not 
required. 2og Nevertheless, as it did in Bankers Trust II, the court 
analyzed the hazards. 2 10 
In its subtle hazards analysis, the Nat West court once again 
looked to Schwab for guidance. 2 11 Schwab, asserted the court, reaf-
firmed Camp's finding that Congress intended to prevent the subtle 
hazards that arise when commercial banks venture into securities 
activities. 2 12 According to the NatWest court, however, the Schwab 
Court had limited Camp's holding by concluding that all of the subtle 
hazards Congress identified were attributable to the "promotional 
pressures" that result from affiliation with entities that purchase 
and sell investments on their own account. 213 
According to the NatWest court, CSC, like Schwab, did not have 
a "salesman's stake" in particular securities. 214 Thus, because the 
combination of investment advice with brokerage did not increase 
205 1d. 
206 l d. at 8 14-15. 
201 1d. at 8 15. 
20>1 Id. at 8 16 n .8. 
2()9 Id. at 8 16. 
21 ° ld. at 8 15-19. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors (Bankers Trust /I), 
807 F.2d J 052, 1066-67 (D.C. Cir. 1986) . The coun stated: 
Id. 
Although the language and the histol'y of the specific provisions su pport the 
reasonableness of the Board 's construction of those provisions, the Board might 
nonetheless be obhga~ed to adopt a different construction if the background 
pohc~es of the Act as mterpreted by the Supreme Court in cases like Camp . .. 
conAl t wIth that constru -to B h S 
. cIOn. . . . ut t e upreme Court's Glass-Steagall Act 
cases un lfo nn ly consider " btl h d" d . 
. . . s~ e azar s an examme background purposes ~l the .Act. U ntil the Court mdlcates that it no longer employs this analysis to 
nterpl et the GlaSS-Steagall Act, we, too, must take such considerations into 
account. 
2 11 Nat W est , 82] F. 2d at 817. 
21 2 Id. at 8 16. 
2 13 Id. 
21 '1 Ill. at 817. 
May 1989] CASENOTES 961 
(he pressure to promote particular securities, NatWest's proposal 
did not implicate any subtle hazards. 2 15 The court added that the 
Board, in determining that the combination of investment advice 
and discount brokerage did not give rise to subtle hazards, acted 
within its discretion in considering the "realities" of the industry 
and the "commitments" made by NatWest.2 16 
The NatWest court concluded that NatWest's proposal to offer 
discount brokerage and investment advisory services through an 
affiliate was permitted by Glass-Steagall.2 17 The court relied in part 
upon principles of judicial defere nce to administrative interpreta-
tions of statutes.218 The court d etermined that the Board reasonably 
interpreted the term "public sale" as it applied to NatWest's pro-
posal. The court then found reasonable the Board's assertion that 
NatWest's proposed activities would not implicate the subtle hazards 
that Congress sought to prevent through enacting Glass-Steagall. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE NATWEST OPINION 
The NatWest court's decision to permit a bank's affiliate to 
provide both discount brokerage and investment advice represents 
a potentially dangerous choice between competing bank policies. 
Although the Supreme Court in Camp pointed out the significance 
of the subtle hazards Congress intended to prevent with Glass-
Steagall, the NatWest court doubted and deflated the importance of 
such an analysis. In doing so, the court incorrectly deemphasized 
the safety and soundness concerns underlying the subtle hazards 
analysis. Thus, the court implicitly elevated the policy of furthering 
competition to a higher plateau than the policy of safety and sound-
ness. Such a policy choice jeopardizes the stability of the banking 
system. 
The NatWest opinion utilized a two-part test to determine 
whether the proposed activities violated Glass-Steagall. First, the 
court decided that NatWest's proposal to provide combined dis-
count brokerage and investment advice through an affiliate did not 
fall within Glass-Steagall's literal prohibitions. Second, the court 
determined that NatWest's proposal did not conflict with Congress's 
intent that Glass-Steagall prevent the subtle hazards that arise. wh~n 
banks participate in the securities field. The court's reasomng 111 
215 Id . 
216 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
217 NatWest, 821 F.2d at 818. 
218 See id. at 820. 
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·part one of the test was sound. Supreme Court precedent clearly 
supported the reasonableness of the position that NatWest's plans 
did not violate Glass-Steagall's literal terms. 219 The second compo-
nent of the opinion, the subtle hazards analysis, presented the court 
with stronger challenges to NatWest's activities. 
NatWest's plans to offer combined discount brok.erage and in-
vestment advice withstood the subtle hazards scrutmy for three 
main reasons. First, the court displayed reluctance even to consider 
the analysis. 220 Second, the court disregarded some apparent haz-
ards. 221 Third, the court accorded great weight to the Board's de-
terminations .222 
The NatWest court first questioned whether a subtle hazards 
analysis was necessary where the activities were not found to fall 
within Glass-Steagall's literal terms. 223 The District of Columbia cir-
cuit's reluctance to consider subtle hazards, first displayed in Bankers 
Trust IJ224 and echoed in NatWest, indicates that it misunderstood 
the significance of such an analysis. The Supreme Court developed 
the subtle hazards analysis after examining Glass-Steagall's legisla-
tive history.225 Congress enacted Glass-Steagall to prevent the subtle 
hazards caused by commercial bank crossover into securities activ-
ities, hazards that erupted into outright abuses prior to the Depres-
sion. 226 The essence of Glass-Steagall is the promotion of the safety 
and soundness of commercial banks by limiting their securities ac-
tivities. 227 The subtle hazards analysis ensures that courts will ex-
amine congressional intent, and reminds courts of the financial 
events that surrounded Glass-Steagall's enactment. The NatWest 
court advocated an approach to Glass-Steagall interpretation that 
would make the literal meaning component of the test a threshold 
concern. Thus, if an activity did not violate the literal terms of the 
statute, th~ subtle hazards analysis would be unnecessary. Such an 
approach IS unwarranted because the Supreme Court devised, and 
~19 See supra notes 123-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of precedent that the 
NalWesl court re~led upon to determine that NatWest's proposed activities did not fall within 
Glass·Steagall's literal prohibition against the "public sale" of securities 
220 See infra notes 224-38 and accompanying text. . 
'2 1 See infra notes 239-44 and accompanying text. 
222 S . ,r: 24" 7 . ee mira notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
m See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
22. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
2 .. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
"26 S ~7 ee supra notes 56-62, 69-73 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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has regularly employed, the subtle hazards analysis in Glass-Steagall 
cases.228 
The NatWest court' hesitance to perform a subtle hazards anal-
ysis demonstrated an insensitivity to the changing face of the finan-
cial services industry.229 Glass-Steagall is over fifty years old, and 
the banking industry has been altered in that time. Thus, it is 
imperative in interpreting Glass-Steagall to look beyond the plain 
meaning of its terms because there are activities and institutions 
that now exist that Congress did not contemplate in 1933. Discount 
brokerage, for example, was not practiced at the time Congress 
passed Glass-Steagal1.230 Though banks did offer full-service bro-
kerage prior to 1933, it is difficult to determine the scope of such 
activities. 23 I Glass-Steagall 's legislative history shows that Congress 
did not fully discuss the extent to which brokerage services impli-
cated the risks associated with securities activities. 232 Therefore, as 
courts and regulators pass upon the acceptability of a securities-
related practice, it is essential that they consider broad congressional 
purpose in enacting Glass-Steagall. 
The NatWest court, in its desire to shelve the subtle hazards 
analysis, disregarded traditional Supreme Court concern for safety 
and soundness of commercial banks. In the seminal Camp decision, 
the Court noted that Congress believed preventing risks associated 
with investment banking outweighed the favorable competitive con-
sequences that might stem from commercial bank involvement in 
securities.233 If courts eliminated the subtle hazards analysis from 
their treatment of Glass-Steagall cases, it would pave the way for 
commercial banks wishing to cross the line into risky securities 
activities. Banks would only have the task of convincing the court 
that the literal terms of Glass-Steagall did not apply to their pro-
posed activities. Unless the court broadly applied Glass-Steagall's 
terms, new forms of securities activities not contemplated by Con-
gress could be approved, possibly in circumvention of legislative 
intent. Removing the subtle hazards barrier would thus further the 
deregulatory aim of improving the competitive position of com-
mercial banks.234 
220 See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. 
2>0 See Note, supra note 51 , at 1498. 
2$1 [d. at 1512-13 n.49. 
m [d. at 1512. 
m See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
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Though the NatWest court did not explicitly disc.uss policy ra-
tionales, one can infer that the court favored the polIcy of compe-
tition over safety and soundness. Becau~e . Gla~s-Steagall cases tra-
ditionally consider the policies invo.lved, It I.S faIr .to assume that the 
NalWest court was mindful of pohcy conslderauons. The NatWest 
decision, combined with subsequent regulatory and judicial disre-
gard for subtle hazards , would increase commercial. bank competi-
tiveness with investment banks. Unfortunately, such IOcreased com-
petitiveness would be at the expense of the safety and soundness of 
the system . 
The court was correct if, indeed, it recognized that allowing 
commercial banks to compete profitably is an important aspect of 
bank regulation. As most high quality corporate customers are now 
served by investment bankers , commercial banks are left with poor 
quality loans. 235 As commercial bank profitability declines, the bank-
ing system grows weaker. 236 Therefore, to enable commercial banks 
to compete for high quality customers, it might be healthy for the 
banking system for regulators and the courts to grant banks more 
latitude in the secUl-ities field. 
Clearly, there are arguments to be made for tearing down the 
Glass-Steagall wall, or at least loosening its restrictions. The advan-
tages for the United States economy resulting from such reform 
might outweigh possible threats to bank safety and soundness. But 
Congress, rather than the courts, should be responsible for making 
such determinations of public policy. Congress's conclusion that the 
safety and soundness of the banking system would be best served 
by separating commercial from investment banking, though over 
fifty years old, remains embodied in Glass-Steagall. Congress has 
had subsequent opportunities to diminish or abolish the distinctions 
between commercial and investment banks. In light of the profound 
changes that the years have wrought in the financial services indus-
try, Cong:ess's failure to enact a comprehensive reform package is, 
pe rhaps,.mexcusable . But such failure does not vest regulators and 
Judges WIth power to fashion new legislation and policy decisions. 
The NalWest court, in its subtle hazards analysis, fai led to dis-
COver some apparent dangers in the proposal to combine investment 
adVICe and dIscount brokerage. The court asserted that an affiliate 
whose profits depended solely upon the volume of shares it traded 
::: ;; e Cla rke, The Ul7!i~, of Bank Regulation , 6 AN . REv. BANKING L. 227, 230 (1987). 
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would not have a promotional interest in particular securities.237 
This assertion is correct with regard to Schwab, in which the affiliate 
offered only brokerage services.23B Where an affiliate also advises 
customers as to which securities to purchase , however, the court's 
reasoning does not hold together. For example, if a corporate cus-
tomer came to ese, which advised that customer to purchase a 
certain security, and then ese brokered shares of the security to 
the customer, ese and NatWest would, naturally, hope that the 
security fared well. The ommon business goal of customer satis-
faction might, therefore , give rise to the subtle hazards eongress 
intended Glass-Steagall to pr vent.239 
Where institutional customers240 are involved, as was the case 
in atWest's proposal , ecurities transactions would likely involve 
large sums of money. Thus, with such high stakes involved for those 
who invest through ese, NatWest's reputation would be on the 
line. Even though the NatWest scheme provided for the bank and 
its affiliate to be distinct entities,24 I sophisticated business customers 
would be likely to know the connection between the two firms. 
Further, because of the possible high stakes involved in ese trans-
actions, the potential for media exposure of securities abuses would 
be great, thus endangering public confidence in NatWest's banking 
activities. 
That NatWest and esc would be linked in the public mind 
could prove dangerous in financially difficult times. Affiliates find 
it hard, generally, to maintain separateness in times of stress.242 This 
difficulty results from the marketplace's habit of attributing the 
problems of one part of a financial entity to the entity as a whole.243 
Thus, in order to save its r:eputation, NatWest might employ unsafe 
or unsound methods of the type detailed in Camp. Because Glass-
Steagall is a prophylactic measure, and because the securities market 
is so volatile, the NatWest court should have perceived the potential 
dangers and reversed the Board's decision to allow brokerage and 
investment advice under one roof. 
237 See supra notes 201-16 and accompanying text. 
238 See supra notes 130- 43 and accompanying text. 
239 See supra notes 102-22 and accompanying text. . 
210 NatWest sought approval to provide services to banks, insur~n:e compames, co~po­
rations , health plans, or natural persons with assets exceeding five million dollars. Securities 
Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors (NatWest) , 821 F.2d 810, 811 0.3 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
24 \ See id. at 812 . 
2<2 72 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ANN. REP. 25 (1986). 
2H ld. 
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The NatWest court was also incorrect in attaching such great 
weight to the Board's determination that subtle haza~ds were not 
implicated because of the "realities" of the brokerage mdustry and 
the "commitments" NatWest made regarding its activities. 244 By 
relying upon NatWest's commitments, the Board was ci~cumventing 
congressional intent in passing Glass-Steagall. SIA's pomt was well-
taken that the Board should not be allowed to transform the broad 
prohibitions contained in Glass-Steagall into a network of adminis-
trative regulation. 245 Further, the Board's express reliance on nu-
merous promises by NatWest suggests that the Board recognized 
the inherent dangers that combined investment advice and discount 
brokerage would implicate. The Board's commitment-based ap-
proval of NatWest's plan would necessitate close supervision once 
esc began operations. If the Board continues to make commitment 
dependent approvals, and the courts uphold such decisions,246 then 
the supervisory and enforcement roles of regulators must increase 
to ensure compliance. As it now stands, regulatory monitoring is 
not capable of maintaining safety and soundness as the courts and 
regulators allow further erosion of Glass-Steagall. 247 As commercial 
banks make more inroads into securities, regulatory agencies should 
increase staff sizes and, as a deterrent, impose tougher sanctions on 
those banks that abuse their ability to have securities affiliates. 
The Nat West opinion, though correct in its examination of 
Glass-Steagall's literal meaning, was deficient in policy analysis, and 
thus wrong in its outcome. The court was hesitant even to consider 
congressional purpose as reflected in the subtle hazards. When the 
2'" See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
N' NatWest, 821 F.2d at 818. 
h 2" 6 See, e.g., Securities Indus .. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 847 F.2d 890 (D,C. Cir. 1988). 
T e court held that a commerCial bank's affiliate may engage in underwriting and dealing 
In commerCial p~per. The court maintained that the Board reasonably interpreted Glass-
~.teagall to permIt banks to have affiliates whose underwriting activities were "regular" or 
Inte~r~ I, " but not "substantiaL" [d. at 893. One of the reasons that the court noted for 
permitting such an affiliation was that the Board's order contained limitations on loans and 
Inve~~~ent a~vice to issuers whose paper the affiliate underwrites, [d . at 899. 
See DILorenzo, supra note 12, at 686-89. DiLorenzo contended that: 
A regulatory approach could exist within a legislative framework that limits 
the type or size of transactions between the underwriting subsidiary or affiliate 
and the bank 01' an approach th t b · h . 
, . a ans any suc transactions. The nature of 
regulatory mOnItol'ing and the ' I bl'd f . 
. ,.' aval a e eVI ence 0 ItS usefulness, indicate that 
shu: h dregulatlOn IS Inherently incapable of uncovering or avoiding potential 
aZar s, mherently Impote nt to h d 
. . correct azar 5 once uncovered and counter-productive In effect. ' 
[d . at 687. 
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court did examine the subtle hazards, it overlooked the significant 
dangers that can arise when financial affiliates are linked in the 
public mind. The court's reliance on the commitments the Board 
extracted from NatWest represented a willingness to circumvent 
congressional intent and an insensitivity to the dynamics of bank 
supervision. If future courts adopt the NatWest posture, safety and 
soundness in the banking industry would diminish. 
CONCLUSION 
The nited States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, in Securities Industry A ssociation v. Board of Governors 
(NatWest), held that a bank's affiLiate could, without vioLating Glass-
Steagall's prohibitions on bank involvement in securities, offer both 
discount brokerage and investment advice. The opinion repre-
sented a determination by the court that the policy of maintaining 
a safe and sound banking system was not as significant as when 
Congress enacted Glass-Steagall. 
Although over fifty years have passed since Congress enacted 
Glass-Steagall, the importance of maintaining a safe and sound 
banking system has not lessened. The recent volatility of the stock 
market and the mounting problems with the savings and loan in-
dustry demonstrate that Congress must remain cautious when de-
termining the extent to which commercial banks should be permit-
ted to engage in securities activities. Congress should act soon with 
a comprehensive reform package that clarifies the boundaries, if 
any, that should exist between commercial and investment banking. 
It is no longer clear that a sharp division ought to exist. On the 
other hand, it remains clear that, because public confidence is so 
vital for the banking system to survive, the safety and soundness 
policy must be the primary consideration in reform efforts. Implicit 
in such a policy recognition is the notion that any loosening of 
Glass-Steagall restrictions should be accompanied by increased 
funding and staffing for supervi;,;ory agencies. Until Congress does 
enact new legislation, the judiciary and regulators should divine and 
implement the policy choices Congress made in 1933 rather than 
furthering their own policy agendas. 
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